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Abstract
Background: More than 72% of health expenditure in India is financed by individual households at the time of
illness through out-of-pocket payments. This is a highly regressive way of financing health care and sometimes
leads to impoverishment. Health insurance is recommended as a measure to protect households from such
catastrophic health expenditure (CHE). We studied two Indian community health insurance (CHI) schemes,
ACCORD and SEWA, to determine whether insured households are protected from CHE.
Methods: ACCORD provides health insurance cover for the indigenous population, living in Gudalur, Tamil
Nadu. SEWA provides insurance cover for self employed women in the state of Gujarat. Both cover
hospitalisation expenses, but only upto a maximum limit of US$23 and US$45, respectively.
We reviewed the insurance claims registers in both schemes and identified patients who were hospitalised during
the period 01/04/2003 to 31/03/2004. Details of their diagnoses, places and costs of treatment and self-reported
annual incomes were obtained. There is no single definition of CHE and none of these have been validated. For
this research, we used the following definition; "annual hospital expenditure greater than 10% of annual income," to
identify those who experienced CHE.
Results: There were a total of 683 and 3152 hospital admissions at ACCORD and SEWA, respectively. In the
absence of the CHI scheme, all of the patients at ACCORD and SEWA would have had to pay OOP for their
hospitalisation. With the CHI scheme, 67% and 34% of patients did not have to make any out-of-pocket (OOP)
payment for their hospital expenses at ACCORD and SEWA, respectively. Both CHI schemes halved the number
of households that would have experienced CHE by covering hospital costs. However, despite this, 4% and 23%
of households with admissions still experienced CHE at ACCORD and SEWA, respectively. This was related to
the following conditions: low annual income, benefit packages with low maximum limits, exclusion of some
conditions from the benefit package, and use of the private sector for admissions.
Conclusion: CHI appears to be effective at halving the incidence of CHE among hospitalised patients. This
protection could be further enhanced by improving the design of the CHI schemes, especially by increasing the
upper limits of benefit packages, minimising exclusions and controlling costs.
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Background
Out-of-pocket payments by individual households are the
main source of health care financing in India. National
health accounts show that 72% of all health expenditure
is made by individual households [1] which is one of the
highest proportions in the world [2]. Estimates from con-
sumer expenditure surveys show that an Indian house-
hold spends an average of 5% of its total expenditure on
health care [3].
Contrary to most other consumption expenses, medical
expenditure is largely unpredictable both in timing and
quantity. Households, especially in low income countries,
cope either by divesting their savings, borrowing, mort-
gaging or selling assets, or by forgoing treatment [4-10].
Many households are impoverished because of medical
expenses. A study covering 5 districts in Rajasthan, India
showed that medical expense was one of the three main
factors pushing people into poverty [11]. A nationally rep-
resentative sample survey indicated that an additional 37
million Indians (3.7% of total population) were impover-
ished in the year 1999 because of health care costs;
increasing poverty head counts by 12% [12]. Still other
studies show that 17 to 34% of hospitalised Indian
patients are impoverished because of medical costs [13].
Such health care expenditures that have an adverse impact
on the household are usually termed "catastrophic health
expenditures (CHE)".
Health insurance is put forward as a measure to protect
against CHE [4,9]. While this is theoretically plausible,
there is little empirical evidence from low-income coun-
tries to support this hypothesis [14]. While Ranson [15]
has demonstrated a reduction in CHE in one community
health insurance (CHI) scheme, in this article we explore
whether the same effect is observed in another CHI
scheme in India. We studied two Indian CHI schemes to
investigate whether they reduced the incidence and inten-
sity of CHE. A second objective was to identify some of the
determinants of CHE in the Indian context. Our research
hypotheses were:
1. CHI schemes protect households from catastrophic
health expenditure
2. The household income, the depth of the benefit pack-
age and the cost of health care determine the incidence
and intensity of CHE.
Finally, based on our findings, we explore how these
schemes' protection against CHE can be enhanced.
This is a comparative study, measuring the effect of two
CHI schemes on CHE. For this study, we purposively
selected two schemes that had different design features –
ACCORD and SEWA (as documented below).
Context
ACCORD, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) in
Tamil Nadu, south India, works for the overall develop-
ment of the indigenous people of the Gudalur sub-dis-
trict. This population also called 'adivasis' have
traditionally been hunters and food gatherers. However,
with progressive deforestation over the past few decades,
most of them have shifted to wage labour. As per the 2001
census, there were 215,269 inhabitants in Gudalur, of
which 14,149 were adivasis [16]. ACCORD collaborates
with a community based organisation, the Adivasi
Munnetra Sangam (AMS), to fight for adivasi rights. In
addition, ACCORD also provides health, education and
agricultural services for the adivasis.
ACCORD's health programme (ASHWINI) is a three tier
health system, with village health workers, health centres
and a 20 bed hospital. Other than the ASHWINI hospital,
there are four other NGO hospitals with a total of 75 beds,
three government hospital (160 beds) and one private
hospital (10 beds) in Gudalur sub district. There are only
four specialists in Gudalur, two in the ASHWINI hospital
and two in the government hospitals.
Part of the ACCORD health service is financed by a CHI
scheme initiated in 1992[17]. All AMS members and their
households are eligible to join the ACCORD CHI scheme
(Figure 1). In 2003, each AMS member paid a premium of
Rs 25 (US$0.54) per person per year during a definite col-
lection period. This premium was collected by ACCORD
and ASHWINI field staff and AMS leaders. Primary care
was provided free to all adivasis, irrespective of their insur-
ance status, by health staff at village and health centre lev-
els. Insured members, if hospitalised in the ASHWINI
hospital, were entitled to hospital care up to a maximum
limit of Rs 1,000 (US$23). Non-insured AMS members
had to meet the costs of medicines (between US$2 and
US$5), while non-adivasi patients had to pay the entire
hospital bill (between US$15 and US$20). This entire
CHI scheme was jointly managed by ACCORD and ASH-
WINI staff and AMS leaders. In turn, ASHWINI reinsured
the adivasis with a private health insurance company.
The Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) is a
union of women employed in the informal sector. While
its main area of operation is Gujarat, it also has presence
in other states of India. Among its diverse activities, it pro-
vides an integrated insurance package – including life,
asset and medical insurance – on a voluntary basis, for its
members and their husbands [18]. In 2003, for an annual
premium equivalent to US $3.20, a couple was insured for
hospital services up to a maximum of US $45 (Figure 2).BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
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The patients could access care in either the public or the
private sector. Patients had to pay the hospital bills and
were reimbursed later by SEWA after producing the neces-
sary documents.
In Gujarat, like in most Indian states, there is a network of
public and private providers, operating independent of
each other. While the government hospitals are based on
population norms: a community health centre with 30
beds for 100,000 population, a sub-district hospital with
100 beds for 500,000 population and a district hospital
with 200 beds for a million population, the private sector
is more diverse and disparate. Most of the private sector
hospitals are located at the district level have just 6 – 30
beds and limited facilities [19].
Both CHI schemes, in principle target the poor and vul-
nerable sections of Indian society. While both are organ-
ised by NGOs and insure against hospital expenditure,
there were some differences. First, at the ACCORD CHI,
all members of the AMS and their family were eligible to
enrol. At SEWA, only the woman member and her spouse
were eligible to enrol in 2003. Secondly, the ACCORD
CHI scheme was a cashless one, so the patient does not
have to pay anything as long as the hospital bill was less
than US$23. At SEWA, the patient had to pay the bills to
the provider and was reimbursed later up to a maximum
of US$45. Furthermore, the ACCORD CHI scheme recog-
nised only one provider, the ASHWINI hospital, which is
a not-for-profit institution. Patients enrolled in the SEWA
scheme sought care at both private and government hos-
The ACCORD community health insurance scheme in 2003 Figure 1
The ACCORD community health insurance scheme in 2003.
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pitals. Lastly, while the ACCORD CHI scheme had mini-
mal exclusions, SEWA usually excluded pre-existing
illnesses from reimbursement, especially during the mem-
ber's first year as a policy-holder. Both schemes were sup-
ported by external donors to a certain extent.
Methods
At both ACCORD and SEWA, we reviewed the insurance
claims registers and identified all the scheme members
who were hospitalized between the period April 2003 to
March 2004, and who registered this hospitalization with
the scheme. For these patients, we collected details on the
age and sex of the patient, diagnosis, total bill amount and
amount paid out-of-pocket by the patient. At SEWA, we
also documented the amount reimbursed subsequently
and the annual household income as reported by the
patient from the insurance claim register. At ACCORD, we
used the median annual household expenditure obtained
from an independent survey (personal communication
2004) to estimate the annual income of the households
with patients.
There is still a lot of debate on the definition of CHE. Most
authors agree that health expenditure is catastrophic if it
forces households to significantly lower their standard of
living now or in the future. While some have defined CHE
if the total health expenditure is more than 10% of annual
income [5,12,15], others have defined it if the total health
expenditure exceeds 40% of disposable income [4]. For
this study we have opted for a modified version of Prad-
han's definition of CHE i.e. "if a household expenditure for
hospitalisation exceeded 10% of the total annual household
income". We used this definition because, according to lit-
erature, 10% of total expenditure is considered as an
approximate threshold at which the poor household is
forced to sacrifice other basic needs, sell productive assets
The SEWA community health insurance scheme in 2003 Figure 2
The SEWA community health insurance scheme in 2003.
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or incur debt [20]. Furthermore, this is a simple calcula-
tion and does not require details of other expenditure like
the expenditure on food.
Using this definition, we calculated the incidence of out-
of-pocket (OOP) payments and CHE. To calculate the
OOP before insurance, we used the gross hospitalisation
expenditure at both ACCORD and SEWA. We then
expressed this expenditure as a proportion of the reported
annual income. If this was more than 10%, then that
household was considered to have experienced CHE.
OOP payment after insurance was calculated by subtract-
ing the total hospital expenditure from the amount reim-
bursed. In the case of ACCORD it was the amount that the
patient had to pay at discharge (if the hospital bill
exceeded the upper limit). CHE was then calculated by
computing this OOP payment (post insurance) as a pro-
portion of the reported annual income. If this was more
than 10%, then that household was considered to have
experienced CHE. The difference gives us an idea of the
effect of the CHI scheme on CHE among these poor
households. We compared the medians and used the 95%
confidence intervals to analyse any differences between
the two schemes. To compare the incidence of CHE by
specific characteristics, we used the risk ratio and the 95%
confidence interval. As we did not have the individual
household income at ACCORD, we limited the analysis of
determinants to the SEWA scheme.
Ethical clearance for this study was provided by the ethical
board of the Sri Chitra Tirunal Institute of Medical Sci-
ences and Technology, Trivandrum, Kerala, India.
Results
In April 2003, a total of 4,268 individuals out of 12,226
AMS members (35%) enrolled in the ACCORD CHI
scheme. In the same period, at SEWA, 101,809 women
and men out of about 500,000 SEWA members (~20%)
enrolled in the CHI scheme (Table 1). 571 individuals
from 476 households were admitted a total of 683 times
at ACCORD, while at SEWA the corresponding figures
were 3080 individuals from 2989 households leading to
3152 admissions. However, we analysed data from only
2974 households as the rest did not have information
about hospitalisation expenses or household incomes.
The admission rates at ACCORD and SEWA were 134 and
37 per 1000 insured per year, respectively. Females
accounted for 59% and 75% of the admissions at
ACCORD and SEWA and the median age of the patients
was 21 and 36 years, respectively. The median household
income (Q1, Q3) at ACCORD was US$630 (518, 813)
while at SEWA it was US$545 (273, 818).
While all of the admissions at ACCORD were in the des-
ignated not-for-profit institution, the ASHWINI hospital;
at SEWA the majority of admissions were in private-for-
profit institutions (Table 2). The median hospital bill at
ACCORD was US$12, while at SEWA it was US$46. How-
ever, because of a combination of low upper limits and
exclusions, some of the patients did not benefit from the
insurance scheme. This occurred more often in SEWA
where 19% of claims were not reimbursed either because
their illness was in the list of exclusions or they had
crossed the upper limit in an earlier admission. At
ACCORD, 74% of all claims were fully covered, while at
SEWA only 38% of all claims were fully reimbursed. The
rest of the patients were only covered up to the upper lim-
its. This resulted in a reimbursement amount which was
significantly lower than the claimed amount at SEWA.
This was further compounded by the fact that at SEWA the
patients had to mobilise financial resources during the
time of illness and were reimbursed later. The median
time to reimbursement was six weeks.
In the absence of health insurance, households at both
ACCORD and SEWA would have paid out-of-pocket to
meet their hospital bills. The median OOP payments
would have been US$18 and US$48, respectively (Table
3). However, thanks to the CHI scheme, 67% of insured
households at ACCORD and 34% of insured households
at SEWA were protected from making OOP payments. The
magnitude of OOP payments also reduced significantly.
Of all the insured households with admissions at
ACCORD, 8% would have experienced catastrophic
health expenditure (CHE) in the absence of an insurance
scheme. However, because of the CHI scheme, this pro-
portion was reduced to 3.5%. At SEWA, 49% of the house-
holds would have been catastrophically affected by the
admission costs if they were not insured. The CHI scheme
at SEWA has been successful in reducing the incidence of
CHE in insured households to 23%. Not only has the inci-
dence of CHE been halved in both the schemes, the mag-
nitude of CHE has also been significantly reduced in both
schemes. This is graphically represented in Figure 3, where
one can see the shift in both the incidence and intensity
after insurance by the SEWA CHI scheme. A sensitivity
analysis at SEWA indicated that an increase in the upper
limit of reimbursement from US$ 45 to US$ 90 would
reduce the incidence of CHE after insurance from 23% to
16%.
There are many causes for the phenomenon of CHE. One
important factor is high medical bills. The medical bills in
these two schemes were very different, nearly four times
higher at SEWA. This difference was further exaggerated
when one disaggregates the data by providers. At SEWA,
the median bill with a private provider was US$48, while
it was only US$28 with a government provider. One pos-
sibility for this difference in price between the twoBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
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schemes could be different case mixes. However, even
though these schemes are more than 1000 km apart and
the populations are different, we note that the case mix is
relatively uniform in both the schemes; the cases are a
mixture of communicable and non-communicable condi-
tions (Table 4). There were more fever cases at SEWA
because of the presence of malaria. At SEWA, pregnancy
related conditions were low because this was excluded
from the benefit package; while at ACCORD; ocular con-
ditions were always referred to a neighbouring ophthal-
mic hospital that provided free services for the adivasis.
What is striking is that the charges for similar conditions
were systematically and significantly more expensive at
SEWA. This is most probably because of the reliance on
private providers at SEWA. We see from Table 5 that the
probability of CHE is high (24%) if the patient has visited
a private provider and is nearly two times more than a
patient who had visited a government provider.
Our results also indicate that at SEWA low annual house-
hold income predisposes a household towards CHE
(Table 5). The SEWA CHI scheme reduced the incidence
of CHE by more than 50% for all but the richest quartile.
Even then, the probability of the lowest quartile experi-
encing CHE per episode is six times higher than for the
richest quartile after insurance. While there was a reduc-
tion in the incidence of CHE by more than two times for
most disease conditions, patients with diseases of the
reproductive system, patients with acute abdominal pain
(including acute surgical illnesses) and patients with non-
communicable diseases still had a high probability of
CHE. Naturally, those whose claims have been rejected
have a much higher probability of CHE, the risk at SEWA
being three times higher.
Discussion
Protecting households against catastrophic health
expenditure is a health policy goal. There is documented
evidence to show that health expenditure can impoverish
households[4]; make them forego further treatment [5],
sell assets [6]; remove children from school [10]; substi-
tute labour [9]; diversify income [21] and even lead to sui-
cide [22]. In India, the two CHI schemes studied were able
to halve the number of households that would have faced
Table 2: Details of claims in two CHI schemes in India (01/04/2003 to 31/03/2004)
ACCORD SEWA
Type of provider
Total claims 683 3152
in government hospitals - 238 (8%)
in NGO hospitals 683 (100%) 204 (6%)
in private-for-profit hospitals - 2710 (86%)
Details of claims made
Median claim amount (95% CI) in US$ 11.8 (10.9, 12.7) 46.4 (45.2, 47.5)
Median claim honoured (95% CI)@ in US$ 10.4 (9.5, 11.2) 12.9 (12.7, 13.1)
Number of claims that were honoured (%) 643 (94%) 2543 (81%)
Number of claims that were fully honoured (%) 507 (79%) 1206 (47%)
Number of claims that were partially honoured (%) 136 (21%) 1337 (53%)
Median delay (Q1, Q3) between discharge and reimbursement in days - 49 (23, 81)
Type of illnesses
Acute illnesses 401 (59%)* 2346 (74%)
Pre-existing illnesses 280 (41%) 806 (26%)
@ The term "honoured" has different implications in the two schemes. At SEWA it means "reimbursement" while at ACCORD, it implies the amount 
paid through direct third party payment.
* Details of 2 episodes not available.
Table 1: Characteristics of hospitalised patients in the two CHI schemes in India (01/04/2003 to 31/03/2004)
ACCORD SEWA
Number of families insured (individuals) 1,028 (4,268) 83,531 (101,809)
Number of admissions 683 3152
Number of families with admissions 476 2989
Admission rates per 1000 individuals 134 37
Number of female admissions (%) 401 (59%) 2370 (75%)
Median age of patient (Q1, Q3) in years 21 (6, 32) 36 (30, 44) *
Median annual income (Q1, Q3) in US$ 630 (518, 813) 545 (273, 818)
* Age of 24 patients were not available in SEWABMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
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CHE. The magnitude of OOP payments was significantly
reduced in both the schemes. This is a substantial achieve-
ment and indicates that these schemes fulfil a significant
insurance function [23].
However, this protection is only partial and some house-
holds still experience CHE, especially the poorest ones.
The incidence of CHE was nearly six times higher among
the poorest quartile than among the richest quartile. This
is understandable as the poor have low incomes and so
any health expenditure can easily exceed 10% of their
incomes. This is more so in a scheme like SEWA, where
bills are reimbursed after a month or more. Patients have
to mobilise resources to pay the bills. Sometimes this is in
the form of short term loans from moneylenders who
charge high interest rates. However, it is positive to note
that the poorer households also benefited the most from
the health insurance mechanism. The risk of CHE reduced
by more than 50% after insurance in the poorest two
quartiles, while in the richest two quartiles, it was less
than 50%. This indicates that such schemes are still pro-
poor in their financial protection function.
One of the limitations of our study is that it is facility
based. For estimating CHE, one should consider all health
expenditure during a full year. However, here we have
assessed the household expenses only for hospitalisation;
therefore, the real incidence and intensity of CHE is
underestimated in our study. However, the high bills asso-
ciated with a hospitalisation generally has a much larger
impact than expenses for ambulatory or preventive care
that are lower in magnitude and spread over time. So, cal-
culating CHE based on hospitalisation expenses gives us a
fair idea of the economic shock experienced by a house-
hold. We do however recognise that that for some house-
holds, even expenditure on medicines can be catastrophic.
At SEWA, patients who had crossed the upper limit in the
first admission may not have submitted a second claim,
knowing that they would not be reimbursed. This further
compounds our underestimate. As we did not have infor-
mation on the individual household incomes of the
patients at ACCORD, we had to use survey data as a proxy
for calculating the CHE. So our calculation of CHE in
ACCORD is actually the proportion of the median house-
hold income. This naturally would result in an underesti-
mation of the incidence of CHE in the poor, while there
would be an overestimation among the better off. This
disparity would depend a lot on the variation of the
income within the community. But, as most adivasi
households at ACCORD are relatively homogenous in
their poverty, we feel that this factor should not affect the
results significantly.
As mentioned earlier, there is considerable debate on the
definition of CHE. While some authors put the threshold
at 10% of the annual income, others use the indicator
based on disposable income. Which is more valid? Is it
relevant to have an uniform threshold, irrespective of the
economic status? It may be presumed that in a poor
household, even a small proportion spent on health care
may be catastrophic. On the other hand a better off house-
hold may be able to absorb the shock of a higher propor-
tion of its income spent on health care. Hence to put
uniform thresholds for all households is somewhat arbi-
trary and misleading. Similarly can this indicator be
equally applied to subsistence farmers? These households
have very little cash transaction and hence even a small
Table 3: Out of pocket payment (OOP) and catastrophic health expenditure (CHE) among households* insured in the two Indian CHIs 
(01/04/2003 to 31/03/2004)
ACCORD CHI scheme SEWA CHI scheme
Number of households that would have paid OOP in the absence of insurance 476 2974
Number of households that paid OOP after insurance (%) 159 (33%) 1953 (66%)
Median OOP payment (95% CI) by households in the absence of insurance (US$) 18 (16, 19)
(n = 476)
48 (46, 49)
(n = 2974)
Median OOP payment (95% CI) by households after insurance (in US$). 13 (10, 17)
(n = 159)
28 (26, 30)
(n = 1953)
Number of households that would have experienced CHE in the absence of 
insurance (% with 95% CI)
39 
8.2% (5.8,11.0)
1461 
49% (47, 51)
Number of households that experienced CHE after insurance (% with 95% CI) 17
3.5% (2.1, 5.6)
694 
23% (22, 25)
Median (95% CI) proportion of annual income that would have been spent on 
hospitalisation by households experiencing CHE before insurance
14% (12, 16)
(n = 39)
14 % (13, 14)
(n = 1461)
Median (95% CI) of proportion of annual income spent on hospitalisation by 
households experiencing CHE after insurance
9% (7, 11)
(n = 39)
9% (8, 10)
(n = 1461)
* Only those households where data for both hospitalisation expenses and annual income were available were included for these calculations
95% CI = 95% confidence intervalBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
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expenditure may be catastrophic, especially if it means
that they have to sell their future food supply. These and
other questions beg answers, which need detailed valida-
tion studies. It was not our purpose to validate any of
these indicators, but to show that even in the presence of
insurance, households do still continue to experience
CHE.
The fact that health expenditure continues to lead to CHE
despite insurance coverage is a concern and is a conse-
quence of various factors. One reason is the low maxi-
mum limit in both schemes. One way of increasing the
protective effect of CHI schemes would be to expand the
maximum limit of the benefit package to cover common
surgical and medical conditions. However, any increase in
the benefit package would be associated with a rise in the
premium. This may adversely affect enrolment. One pos-
sible solution is for government or donors to subsidise the
premiums, especially for the poorer households. This
would allow the poor to enrol in the scheme as well as
protect them from CHE.
It was surprising to see that though SEWA has a higher
upper limit, more patients pay OOP and more house-
holds experience CHE. One important reason could be
the higher bills at SEWA. Another measure to reduce the
risk of CHE would thus be to reduce the costs of health
care. From our data we note that the prices of hospital
services for similar conditions were systematically higher
at SEWA compared to ACCORD. This could be because of
the predominant use of the private sector in SEWA. In
India, CHI schemes may be forced to use the private
health services if they want to provide their community
with choices; but in this case, they would need to intro-
duce certain cost containment measures. One measure
could be to pay providers on a case basis, rather than on a
fee-for-service basis [24]. This in itself would reduce the
danger of unnecessary interventions.
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure among insured patients in SEWA, India (2003–2004) Figure 3
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure among insured patients in SEWA, India (2003–2004)
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This tendency for health insurance to increase the total
health care expenditure of households is described by
Bogg et al in their study in China [25]. They show that in
two neighbouring districts, one with a CHI scheme cover-
ing the population and another with user fees; the former
district had higher total health expenditure over time,
mainly for curative care and with over prescription of
medicines being the rule of the day. A second measure to
reduce costs is to insist on the use of generics and standard
treatment protocols for common ailments. If this could be
combined with other technical tools like medical audits
and appropriate evaluation protocols [26], then the qual-
ity of the care provided could also be considerably
enhanced. Thus, CHI schemes could be used not only to
provide financial protection for households, but could
also improve the quality of the services by acting as a "stra-
tegic purchaser" of health care services [27]. The latter
would be useful in a situation where the quality of care in
the private sector is questionable [28].
Exclusions in a health insurance scheme are detrimental
for various reasons. From the patient's perspective, it adds
to the uncertainty at the time of care. From a public health
perspective, it does not provide protection for those
patients who are the most vulnerable i.e. patients with
chronic illness and who require regular medications [29].
Finally, it is in conflict with the principles of social health
insurance. This study shows that even poor populations
have a significant prevalence of non-communicable dis-
eases and that exclusion of these conditions can have an
economic impact. Patients whose claims have been
rejected because of exclusions have a higher probability of
CHE. This has policy implications and designers of CHI
schemes need to ensure that exclusions are minimised
and that people are covered for a comprehensive range of
illnesses.
Conclusion
CHE is a major cause of impoverishment and patients
need to be protected from it [29]. Some of the docu-
mented determinants of CHE are poverty, household size,
high medical costs, incidence of illness, payment mecha-
nisms, low benefit packages and presence of 'smokers or
drinkers' in the household [4,30-33]. We show here that
the incidence of CHE is also related to the type of pro-
vider; private-for-profit providers considerably increase
the probability of CHE. We have documented some of the
illnesses that can lead to CHE, namely surgical ailments
and admissions for non-communicable diseases.
Indian CHI schemes are able to protect their members
against CHE, but only to a limited level. However, this
protection can be further enhanced if some design
changes are incorporated. To begin with, the upper limit
of the benefit package needs to be raised. To keep the pre-
miums affordable, donors or the government would need
to directly subsidise the premium, especially for the
poorer sections of society. Exclusions need to be mini-
mised to protect vulnerable populations. And finally,
scheme managers need to negotiate costs with providers
from the start [34] to ensure that costs are contained. Such
measures could considerably reduce the incidence and
magnitude of CHE and protect households from iatro-
genic poverty [29].
NB: Subsequent to our study, SEWA has made significant
changes in its design, including expansion of eligibility to
include all members of the family and piloting of a third
Table 4: Reasons for hospitalisation and associated costs per episode from two CHI schemes in India, (01/04/03 to 31/03/04).
Top ten reasons for hospitalisation ACCORD SEWA
Number of admissions*
(% of total; 95% CI)
Median claim (US$)
(95% CI)
Number of admissions
(% of total; 95% CI)
Median claim (US$)
(95% CI)
Respiratory tract infections incl. TB 125 (18%; 15, 21) 11 (9, 12) 306 (10%; 9, 11) 46 (43, 49)
Pregnancy related conditions 104 (15%; 12, 18) 22 (18, 25) 31 (1%; 0.7, 1.4) 39 (27, 51)
Diarrhoeal diseases and dysentery 84 (12%; 10, 15) 6 (5, 7) 331 (11%; 9, 11) 47 (45, 49)
Fevers 61 (9%; 7, 11) 11 (9, 12) 745 (24%; 22, 25) 43 (41, 45)
Non-communicable diseases 57 (8%; 6, 10) 12 (8, 15) 264 (8%; 7, 9) 50 (44, 56)
Diseases of the urinary system 39 (6%; 4, 8) 14 (10, 18) 142 (5%; 4, 5) 48 (43, 53)
Acute Abdomen (including laparotomies) 36 (5%; 4, 7) 11 (7, 15) 174 (6%; 5, 6) 52 (44, 61)
Injuries 31 (5%; 3, 6) 15 (8, 22) 405 (13%; 12, 14) 36 (33, 39)
Diseases of the reproductive system (including Hysterectomies) 32 (5%; 3, 6) 22 (17, 26) 194 (6%; 5, 7) 77 (67, 87)
Ocular conditions 0 (0%) 0 113 (4%; 3, 4) 47 (39, 55)
Others 112 (16%; 14, 19) 11 (9, 13) 447 (14%; 13, 15) 49 (45, 53)
All episodes 681 (100%) 12 (11, 13) 3152 (100%) 46 (45, 47)
* Details of 2 episodes not available.BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
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party payment mechanism. ACCORD has increased its
upper limit from US$ 23 to US$ 69.
Abbreviations
ACCORD Action for Community Organisation, Rehabili-
tation and Development
AMS Adivasi Munnetra Sangam
ASHWINI Association for Health Welfare in the Nilgiris
SEWA Self Employed Women's Association
NGO Non-governmental organisation
CHE Catastrophic health expenditure
CHI Community health insurance
OOP Out-of-pocket
SCTIMST Sree Chitra Tirunal Institute for Medical Sci-
ences and Technology
Competing interests
This is certify that Dr. N. Devadasan, was the founder of
the ACCORD CHI. He is however, not directly involved
with the project anymore and is currently a visiting faculty
at SCTIMST and pursuing a PhD with the ITM, Antwerp.
Dr MK Ranson was involved with SEWA while pursuing
his PhD and post doctoral research.
Dr. Wim van Damme, Dr Bart Criel and Dr Patrick Van der
Stuyft have not been associated either with ACCORD or
with SEWA.
The authors declare no financial competing interest.
Authors' contributions
ND conceptualised the study and participated in it by col-
lecting the data at ACCORD, analysing and interpreting
the data and drafting the manuscript. WVD conceptual-
ised the study, assisted in interpretation of the data and
revised the manuscript critically. KR participated in the
study by collecting the data at SEWA and revised the man-
uscript critically. BC assisted in interpretation of the data
Table 5: Incidence of catastrophic health expenditure per episode at SEWA by specific characteristics
Number
of cases
(%)
Number of cases with CHE
(%) before insurance
Number of cases with
CHE (%) after insurance
Probability of
experiencing CHE
before insurance
(95% CI)
Probability of
experiencing CHE
after insurance
(95% CI)
Provider
Private 2711 (86%) 1339 (89%) 640 (90%) 49% (47, 51) 24% (22, 25)
NGO 204 (6%) 74 (5%) 41 (6%) 36% (30, 43) 20% (15, 26)
Government 236 (8%) 84 (6%) 30 (4%) 35% (29, 42) 13% (9, 18)
Annual household income
Q1 928 (31%) 845 (56%) 396 (57%) 91% (89, 93) 43% (39, 46)
Q2 561 (19%) 346 (23%) 145 (21%) 62% (57, 66) 26% (22, 30)
Q3 869 (29%) 234 (16%) 112 (16%) 27% (24, 30) 13% (11, 15)
Q4 616 (21%) 71 (5%) 41 (6%) 11% (9, 14) 7% (5, 9)
Diagnosis
Fevers 745 (24%) 365 (25%) 126 (18%) 49% (45, 53) 17% (14, 20)
Injuries 405 (13%) 142 (10%) 70 (10%) 35% (30, 40) 17% (14, 21)
Diarrhoeal diseases 331 (11%) 123 (8%) 35 (5%) 37% (32, 42) 11% (7, 14)
Respiratory tract infections 306 (10%) 157 (10%) 66 (9%) 51% (45, 57) 22% (17, 27)
Non-communicable diseases 264 (8%) 139 (9%) 78 (11%) 53% (46, 59) 30% (24, 35)
Acute abdominal conditions (incl.
laparotomies)
174 (6%) 100 (7%) 62 (9%) 57% (50, 65) 36% (29, 43)
Diseases of the reproductive system
(incl. hysterectomies)
194 (6%) 117 (8%) 87 (12%) 60% (53, 67) 45% (38, 52)
Diseases of the urinary system 142 (5%) 74 (5%) 31 (4%) 52% (44, 61) 22% (15, 30)
Ocular conditions 113 (4%) 44 (3%) 20 (3%) 39% (30, 49) 18% (11, 26)
Exclusions
Claim rejected 608 (19%) 306 (20%) 306 (43%) 50% (46, 54) 50% (46, 54)
Claim accepted 2544 (81%) 1191 (80%) 405 (57%) 47% (45, 49) 16% (14, 17)
95% CI = 95% confidence intervalPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43
Page 11 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
and revised the manuscript critically for substantial intel-
lectual content. PVDS conceptualised the study and
assisted in interpretation of the data and revised the man-
uscript critically for substantial intellectual content.
All the authors confirm that they had access to all the data,
have read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank ACCORD and SEWA for allowing us to use 
their data. This study was possible thanks to a grant to Dr N. Devadasan 
from the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, Belgium, in the frame 
of their 5-year agreement (2003–2007) with the Belgian Directorate Gen-
eral of Development Cooperation. The research work was also funded by 
the Sir Ratan Tata Trust, Mumbai, India, through the Foundation for 
Research in Health Systems, Ahmedabad. We would also like to acknowl-
edge the editorial services of the "American Journal Experts."
References
1. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare: National Health Accounts, India
New Delhi: Government of India; 2006. 
2. WHO:  The world health report 2006 – working together for health
Geneva: WHO; 2006. 
3. Garg CC, Karan AK: Health and Millennium Development Goal 1: Reduc-
ing out-of-pocket expenditures to reduce income poverty – Evidence from
India Manila: Equitap; 2005. 
4. Ke X, Evans DB, Kawabata K, Zeramdini R, Klavus J, Murray CJ:
Household catastrophic health expenditure: a multi-country
analysis.  Lancet 2003, 362:111-117.
5. Pradhan M, Prescott N: Social risk management options for
medical care in Indonesia.  Health Economics 2002, 11:431-446.
6. Van Damme W, Van Leemput L, Por I, Hardemann W, Meessen B:
Out-of-pocket health expenditure and debt in poor house-
holds: evidence from Cambodia.  Trop Med Int Health 2004,
9:273-80.
7. Gertler P, Levine DI, Moretti E: Do Microfinance Programs Help Families
Insure Consumption Against Illness? Berkeley: University of California;
2003. 
8. Incidence of non-fatal health outcomes and debt in urban India World
Bank; 2002. 
9. Sauerborn R, Adams A, Hien M: Household strategies to cope
with the economic costs of illness.  Soc Sci Med 1996,
43(3):291-301.
10. Van Damme W, Meessen B, Por I, Kober K: Catastrophic Health
Expenditure [Letter].  Lancet 2003, 362:996.
11. Krishna A: Escaping poverty and becoming poor: who gains,
who loses and why?  World Development 2004, 32(1):121-136.
12. van Doorslaer E, O'Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, Samanathan A,
Adhikari SR, Garg CC, Harbrianto D, Herrin AN, Huq MN, Ibragi-
mova S, Karan A, Ng CW, Pande BR, Racelis R, Tao S, Tin K, Tisaya-
ticom K, Trisnantoro L, Vasavid C, Zhao Y: Effect of payments for
health care on poverty estimates in 11 countries in Asia: an
analysis of household survey data.  Lancet 2006, 368:1357-1361.
13. Peters DH, Yazbeck AS, Sharma RS, Ramana GNV, Pritchett LH,
Wagstaff A: Better Health Systems for India's poor Washington: World
Bank; 2002. 
14. Task Force on Health System Research: Informed choices for
attaining the Millennium Development Goals: towards an
international cooperative agenda for health-systems
research.  Lancet 2004, 364:997-1003.
15. Ranson M: Reduction of catastrophic health care expendi-
tures by a community-based health insurance scheme in
Gujarat, India: current experiences and challenges.  Bull World
Health Organ 2002, 80:613-621.
16. Tamil Nadu Census 2001   [http://www.census.tn.nic.in/
default.htm]. Accessed on 24-8-0006
17. Devadasan N, Manoharan S, Menon N, Menon S, Thekaekara M,
Thekaekara S, AMS team: Accord community health insurance
– Increasing access to hospital care.  Economic and Political Weekly
2004, 39:3189-3194.
18. Garand D: Vimo SEWA India Washington: CGAP; 2005. 
19. George Alex: Quality of reproductive care in private hospitals
in Andhra Pradesh: Women's perception.  Economic and Political
Weekly 2002, 37:1686-1692.
20. van Doorslaer E, O'Donnell O, Rannan-Eliya RP, Somanathan A,
Adhikari SR, Akkazieva B, Garg CC, Harbrianto D, Herrin AN, Huq
MN, Ibragimova S, Karan A, Lee T, Leung GM, Lu JR, Ng CW, Pande
BR, Racelis R, Tao S, Tin K, Tisayaticom K, Trisnantoro L, Visasvid C,
Zhao Y: Paying out-of-pocket for health care in Asia: Catastrophic and pov-
erty impact Manila: Equitap; 2005. 
21. McIntyre D, Thiede M, Dahlgren G, Whitehead M: What are the
economic consequences for households of illness and of pay-
ing for health care in low- and middle-income country con-
texts?  Soc Sci Med 2006, 62:858-865.
22. Sainath P: Anatomy of a health disaster.  The Hindu 2004 Jul 1 .
23. Kutzin J: Enhancing the insurance function of health systems:
A proposed conceptual framework.  In Achieving Universal Cover-
age of Health care Bangkok: MOH – Thailand; 1998:27-101. 
24. Liu X, Mills Anne: Evaluating payment mechanisms: how can
we measure unnecessary care?  Health Policy and Planning 1999,
14(4):409-413.
25. Bogg L, Hengjin D, Keli W, Wenwei C, Diwan V: The cost of cov-
erage: rural health insurance in China.  Health Policy and Planning
1996, 11(3):238-252.
26. Brook RH: Appropriateness: the next frontier.  BMJ 1994,
308:218-219.
27. WHO: The World Health Report 2000: Health systems: Improving per-
formance Geneva: WHO; 2000. 
28. Ranson M, John K: Quality of Hysterectomy Care in Rural
Gujarat: The Role of Community-based Health Insurance.
Reproductive Health Matters 2002, 10(20):70-81.
29. Meessen B, Zhenzhong Z, Van Damme W, Devadasan N, Criel B,
Bloom G: Editorial: Iatrogenic poverty.  Trop Med Int Health 2003,
8(7):581-584.
30. Gertler P, Gruber J: Insuring consumption against illness.  The
American Economic Review 2002, 92(1):51-70.
31. Bonu S, Rani M, Peter D, Jha P, Nguyen SN: Does use of tobacco
or alcohol contribute to impoverishment from hospitaliza-
tion costs in India?  Health Policy and Planning 2005, 20(1):41-49.
32. Kawabata K, Xu K, Carrin G: Preventing impoverishment
through protection against catastrophic health expenditure.
Bull World Health Organ 2002, 80(8):612.
33. Arhin-Tenkorang D: Health Insurance for the informal sector in Africa:
Design features, Risk protection and resource mobilisation Cambridge:
CMH; 2001. 
34. Ramesh Bhat: Regulation of the Private Health Sector in India.
Int Journal of Health Planning and Management 1996, 11:253-274.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/43/prepub